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Abstract:	   We	   examine	   whether	   and	   how	   word	   choice	   can	   affect	   individual	   perceptions	   about	   a	  
proposed	   Payments	   for	   Ecosystem	   Services	   (PES)	   program	   when	   objective	   outcomes	   are	   similar.	  
From	  a	  traditional	  economic	  perspective,	  this	  type	  of	  manipulation	  would	  be	  considered	  unlikely	  to	  
affect	   perceptions	   and	  behaviour,	   especially	   in	   the	  presence	  of	   pecuniary	   incentives	   and	   repeated	  
decisions	   among	   sophisticated	   agents.	   From	   a	   behaviourally	   informed	   perspective,	   however,	  
psychological	  and	  political	  theories	  of	  wording	  argue	  that	  word	  choice	  can	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  
on	  economic	  behaviour.	  To	  substantiate	  this	  discussion,	  we	  conduct	  a	  survey	  experiment	  that	  tests	  
the	   impact	   of	   the	   words	   ‘payment’	   and	   ‘compensation’	   on	   favorability	   ratings	   of	   a	   proposed	   PES	  
program.	  These	  preliminary	  findings	  suggest	  that	  the	  words	  used	  to	  describe	  public	  policies	  can	  be	  




Wording	  is	  an	  important	  consideration	  in	  endeavors	  that	  engage	  the	  public.	  Marketers,	  for	  instance,	  
invest	  considerable	  resources	   in	  naming	  brands	  and	  products	   (Colapinto,	  2011).	  The	   importance	  of	  
linguistic	  choices	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  political	  domain,	  where	  it	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  every	  detail	  of	  
a	  message	  can	  be	  leveraged	  to	  serve	  a	  specific	  goal	  (Brewer	  2001,	  Burnett	  and	  Kogan	  2015).	  There	  is	  
less	   consensus	   regarding	   the	   significance	   of	   words	   in	   economics,	   where	   two	   conflicting	   views	  
emerge.	   Under	   classic	   assumptions,	   words	   are	   often	   discussed	   in	   the	   context	   of	   cheap-­‐talk,	   and	  
monetary	  outcomes	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  more	  important	  determinant	  of	  behaviour.	  Despite	  this,	  
some	  studies	  have	   found	  that	  scenarios	  characterized	  by	   identical	  monetary	   incentives	  can	   lead	   to	  
different	   behaviours	   according	   to	   the	   words	   used	   to	   describe	   them,	   such	   as	   rebate	   versus	   bonus	  
(Epley	  et	  al.,	  2006)	  or	  tax	  versus	  offset	  (Hardisty	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Results	  like	  these	  suggest	  that	  even	  a	  
single	  word	  can	  indeed	  affect	  people’s	  behaviours.	  	  
In	   the	   context	  of	  market-­‐based	   instruments	   for	  environmental	   conservation,	   such	  as	  Payments	   for	  
Ecosystem	  Services	  (PES),	  the	  terms	  ‘compensation’	  and	  ‘payment’	  are	  both	  frequently	  used	  to	  refer	  
to	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  participants	  receive	  in	  exchange	  for	  providing	  an	  environmental	  service.	  In	  a	  
neoclassical	   framework,	   the	   label	  used	   to	  describe	  this	   incentive	   is	  assumed	  not	   to	  have	  any	  great	  
implications	  for	  behaviour.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  pecuniary	  outcomes	  are	  the	  primary	  determinant	  
of	  behaviour.	  Insights	  from	  behavioural	  economics,	  in	  contrast,	  suggest	  that	  other	  forces	  may	  be	  at	  
	  	  
work,	   which	   could	   explain	   why	   differently-­‐labeled	   alternatives	   can	   impact	   behaviour	   in	   different	  
ways	  even	  when	  these	  alternatives	  possess	  similar	  economic	  characteristics	  (Feldman	  and	  Teichman,	  
2008;	   Thaler,	   1999).	   This	   debate	   has	   not	   yet	   been	   addressed	   in	   the	   PES	   literature,	   where	   the	  
discussions	  on	  terminology	  focus	  essentially	  on	  theoretical	  definitions.	  (Wunder	  2005).	  	  
	  
In	  what	   follows,	  we	   first	   elaborate	   on	   the	   two	  main	   views	   regarding	  whether	   and	   how	  words	   are	  
likely	   to	   influence	  perceptions,	  decisions	  and	  behaviours,	  and	  we	  present	  some	  empirical	  evidence	  
relevant	   to	   this	   discussion.	   Secondly,	   we	   conduct	   a	   pilot	   study	   to	   investigate	   whether	   people’s	  
judgment	  of	  a	  proposed	  PES	  program	  differs	  if	  the	  money	  received	  is	  described	  using	  different	  labels	  
(i.e.,	   ‘compensation’	   vs.	   ‘payment’).	   The	   study	   is	   located	   in	   a	   developing	   country,	   namely	  
Madagascar,	  where	  one	  might	  expect	  subtle	  linguistic	  manipulations	  to	  have	  an	  insignificant	  impact	  
on	   behaviour	   compared	   to	   actual	   monetary	   incentives.	   Finally,	   we	   conclude	   and	   discuss	   several	  
policy	  implications.	  	  
	  
2.	  How	  can	  words	  change	  the	  world?	  
In	  a	  traditional	  neoclassical	  approach,	  only	  objective	  pecuniary	  outcomes	  such	  as	  payoffs	  matter	  to	  
decision-­‐makers.	  Many	  economic	  models	  as	  they	  are	  applied	  today	  often	  adopt	  this	  narrow	  view	  of	  
human	  behaviour	  by	  focusing	  solely	  on	  instrumental	  utility,	  according	  to	  which	  only	  final	  outcomes	  
enter	   into	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  This	  assumption	   implies	  that	  agents	  have	  preferences	  over	  
the	  ex-­‐post	  distribution	  of	  wealth,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  value	  the	  process	  by	  which	  these	  final	  outcomes	  
are	  generated	  (a	  process	  that	  can	  conceivably	  encompass	  descriptive,	  i.e.	  linguistic,	  elements).	  From	  
this	  perspective,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  meaning	  conveyed	  in	  a	  description	  is	  equivalent,	  the	  use	  of	  different	  
words	  should	  not	  influence	  the	  decisions	  made	  by	  the	  self-­‐interested	  individual,	  and	  word	  choice	  is	  
often	  discussed	  only	   in	   the	  context	  of	   ‘cheap	   talk’.	   This	   view	  may	  appear	  even	  more	  convincing	   in	  
countries	  where	  fundamental	  needs	  are	  in	  general,	  not	  fully	  satisfied.	  In	  these	  and	  all	  contexts,	  the	  
use	   of	   one	  word	   or	   another	   (e.g.,	   compensation	   or	   payment)	   in	   referring	   to	   the	   same	   amount	   of	  
money	  should	  not	  change	  perceptions,	  decisions	  or	  behaviours.	  Moreover,	  even	  if	   lay	  people	  could	  
be	   influenced	   by	   such	   manipulations	   in	   one	   shot	   interactions,	   one	   would	   expect	   repetition	   to	  
eliminate	   these	   effects.	   In	   sum,	   sophisticated	   agents	   are	   assumed	   to	   pay	   attention	   strictly	   to	   the	  
denotative	   meaning	   of	   the	   words	   that	   they	   encounter	   as	   well	   as	   focus	   solely	   on	   objective	   final	  
outcomes	  (i.e.	  monetary	  payoffs)	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  Although	  this	  viewpoint	  continues	  to	  be	  shared	  by	  
some	   economists	   who	   consider	   human	   beings	   to	   be	   Econs	   (Thaler	   and	   Sunstein,	   2008),	   other	  
	  	  
economists	  do	  recognize	  that	  ‘cheap	  talk’	  can	  influence	  decision	  making	  in	  Humans	  (and	  even	  Econs)	  
in	  various	  contexts	  (Farrell,	  1995).	  	  
Unlike	   the	   traditional	   approach	   that	   considers	   only	   denotative	  meanings	   and	   objective	   outcomes,	  
several	  psychological	  mechanisms	  provide	  a	  conceptual	  basis	  for	  how	  words	  can	  affect	  perceptions,	  
decisions	   and	   behaviours	   in	   surprising	  ways	   (Farrow	   et	   al.,	   2016).	  We	   review	   several	  mechanisms	  
that	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  matter	  with	  respect	  to	  environmental	  behaviours,	  and	  especially	  with	  respect	  
to	  the	  two	  words	  we	  experimentally	  investigate	  (payment	  versus	  compensation)	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
provision	  of	  ecosystem	  services.	  	  
First,	   the	   words	   one	   confronts	   in	   any	   given	   situation	   can	   elicit	   cognitive	   deliberation	   using	   either	  
System	   1	   or	   System	   2,	   the	   two	   basic	   systems	   that	   the	   brain	   employs	   to	   process	   information	  
(Kahneman,	   2011).	   Whereas	   System	   1	   is	   characterized	   as	   fast,	   automatic,	   frequent,	   emotional,	  
stereotypic	  and	  subconscious,	  System	  2	  is	  described	  as	  slow,	  effortful,	  infrequent,	  logical,	  calculating	  
and	   conscious.	   By	   choosing	   to	   use	   specific	   words,	   one	   can	   (voluntarily	   or	   involuntarily)	   solicit	  
processing	  via	  System	  1	   (vs.	  System	  2),	  and	   in	  doing	  so	   induce	  affect-­‐driven	   (vs.	  analytical	  or	  more	  
reflexive)	   reactions	   that	   frequently	   operate	   under	   the	   radar	   of	   consciousness	   (vs.	   consciously	   and	  
deliberately).	   In	   this	  way,	  words	  have	   the	  ability	   to	   lead	   to	  either	   superficial	  or	  deeper	  processing,	  
which	   can	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   subsequent	   behaviour.	   In	   support	   of	   this	   phenomenon,	   empirical	  
evidence	   shows	   that	   objectively	   identical	   information	   seems	   to	   be	   processed	   more	   fully	   when	  
expressed	  in	  negative	  rather	  than	  positive	  terms	  (Baumeister	  et	  al.,	  2001;	  Cialdini	  et	  al.,	  2006	  for	  an	  
environmental	   application)	   and	   that	   using	   one	   particular	   word	   rather	   than	   another	   (even	   if	   the	  
person	  using	  these	  words	  may	  be	  unaware	  of	  their	   impact)	   is	  not	  without	  behavioural	   implications	  
(Drews	   and	   Antal,	   2016).	   The	   possible	   impacts	   that	   words	   can	   have	   on	   behaviour	   becomes	   even	  
more	   complex	   when	   considering	   the	   fact	   that,	   in	   addition	   to	   denotative	   meanings	   (i.e.	   literal	  
meaning,	   as	   described	   in	   the	   dictionary),	   words	   frequently	   evoke	   connotative	   meanings	   (i.e.	  
meanings	   that	   may	   simply	   be	   associated	   with	   the	   literal	   meaning),	   as	   well.	   In	   some	   cases,	   the	  
provocative	   connotative	   meaning	   evoked	   by	   a	   word	   may	   be	   more	   readily	   accessible	   than	   its	  
denotative	  meaning	  and	  may	   lead	   to	  hasty,	  affect-­‐driven	   reactions.	  A	   recent	   study	   (Hardisty	  et	  al.,	  
2010)	  shows	  that	  the	  same	  cost	  labelled	  as	  either	  a	  ‘carbon	  tax’	  or	  a	  ‘carbon	  offset’	  impacts	  people’s	  
preferences	   in	  different	  ways	  according	   to	   their	  political	   affiliation.	   Individuals	  who	   reported	  more	  
liberal	   political	   views	   did	   not	   discriminate	   between	   the	   two	   labels,	   whereas	   those	   who	   reported	  
more	  conservative	  political	  views	  strongly	  preferred	  the	  carbon	  offset	  to	  the	  carbon	  tax,	  even	  though	  
the	  measure	  described	  was	  of	  equal	  magnitudes.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  tax	  label	  seemed	  to	  trigger	  System	  
1	  among	  conservative	  individuals,	  eliciting	  negative,	  stereotypical	  thoughts	  and	  associations,	  thereby	  
	  	  
increasing	  their	  propensity	  to	  reject	  the	  measure	  (Hardisty	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  see	  also	  Sussman	  and	  Olivola,	  
2011).	  	  
Second,	   another	   stream	   of	   literature	   shows	   that	   words	   can	   be	   capable	   of	   invoking	   preconscious	  
conceptual	  associations	  that	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  generate	  biases	  in	  perception	  and	  decision	  making	  
in	   various	   domains	   (Alter,	   2013;	  Nelson	   and	   Simmons,	   2009;	  Meier	   et	   al.,	   2011;	  Drews	   and	  Antal,	  
2016).	  Words	   can	  even	   lead	   to	   self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecies	   (Becker,	   1963)	  when	   the	   label	   attached	   to	  
something	   (e.g.,	   ‘dirty	   money’)	   alters	   the	   perception	   of	   the	   thing	   itself	   (i.e.,	   money)	   and	   related	  
decisions	  that	  may	  be	  related	  to	  it	  (e.g.,	  higher	  level	  of	  prosocial	  spending)	  (Park	  and	  Meyvis,	  2015).	  
Certain	  words,	  for	  instance	  can	  lead	  people	  to	  associate	  money	  with	  specific	  uses,	  which	  can	  lead	  to	  
categorizing	   identical	   amounts	   of	   money	   into	   separate	   mental	   accounts	   that,	   contrary	   to	   the	  
predictions	   of	   conventional	   economic	   theory,	   are	   not	   fungible	   (Thaler,	   1999;	   Epley	   et	   al.,	   2006).	  
While	   some	   words	   activate	   a	   calculative	   and	   business	   mindset	   (outcome-­‐based	   decisions),	   other	  
words	  may	  invite	  an	  ethical	  or	  moral	  mindset	  (rules-­‐based	  decisions)	  (Tan	  and	  Low,	  2011;	  Tenbrunsel	  
and	   Messick,	   2004;	   Vohs,	   2015).	   An	   interesting	   example	   of	   the	   power	   of	   words	   on	   perceptions,	  
decisions	  and	  behaviours	  is	  provided	  by	  Tan	  and	  Low	  (2011)	  who	  examined	  how	  the	  words	  used	  to	  
describe	   compensations	   given	   to	   organ	   donors	   can	   significantly	   change	   people’s	   perceptions	   and	  
subsequent	   behaviours.	   Based	   on	   these	   findings,	   the	   Singaporean	   government	   carefully	   avoided	  
using	   the	   word	   ‘payment,’	   when	   defraying	   the	   expenses	   associated	   with	   organ	   donation,	   as	  
‘payment’	   can	   effectively	   transform	   the	   perception	   of	   this	   altruistic	   act	   into	   a	   commercial	  
transaction,	   and	   was	   therefore	   likely	   to	   generate	   a	   crowding-­‐out	   of	   intrinsic	   motivation	   (Bowles,	  
2008).	  The	  authorities	  instead	  opted	  to	  use	  the	  word	  ‘reimbursement’.	  	  
In	   a	   similar	   vein,	  we	   suspect	   that	   the	  word	   ‘payment’	   is	  more	   likely	   to	   evoke	   a	   business	  mindset,	  
triggering	   market	   norms	   of	   behaviour	   rather	   than	   social	   or	   moral	   norms.	   This	   market-­‐oriented	  
mindset	  can	  undermine	   intrinsic	  motivations	   to	  preserve	   the	  environment	  and	   lead	   to	  a	  crowding-­‐
out	   effect	   (Frey	   and	   Oberholzer-­‐Gee,	   1997;	   Vollan,	   2008).	   Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   word	  
‘compensation’	  also	  conjures	   thoughts	  of	  money,	  we	  believe	   that	   the	  associations	   it	   tends	   to	  elicit	  
are	  less	  related	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  manipulation	  and	  other	  negative	  perceptions	  that	  can	  accompany	  the	  
word	   ‘payment.’	   By	   avoiding	   such	   connotations,	   a	   milder	   word	   like	   ‘compensation’	   conceivably	  
preserves	   people’s	   sense	   of	   agency	   and	   freedom,	   and	  may	   therefore	   be	  more	   supportive	   of	   pre-­‐
existing	  intrinsic	  motivations	  to	  behave	  prosocially.	  In	  short,	  we	  contend	  that,	  ceteris	  paribus,	  stated	  
support	  for	  a	  prosocial	  behaviour	  will	  be	  higher	  when	  an	  identical	  monetary	  incentive	  is	  labelled	  as	  
compensation	   rather	   than	   payment.	   Based	   on	   the	   preceding	   discussion,	   our	   main	   behavioural	  
	  	  
hypothesis	   is	   that	   payment	   and	   compensation	   are	   characterized	   by	   different	   conceptual	   and	  
associative	  properties.	  	  
	  
3.	  Experimental	  survey	  	  
In	   this	   section,	  we	   report	   the	   results	   of	   a	   survey	  experiment	  whose	  purpose	  was	   to	   (i)	   investigate	  
whether	  the	  wording	  used	  to	  describe	  an	  environmental	  program	  impacts	  individual	  opinions	  and	  (ii)	  
indicate	   which	   word	   is	   more	   suitable	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   desired	   policy	   objective.	   Market-­‐based	  
instruments	   such	   as	   PES	   are	   increasingly	   popular	   tools	   to	   financially	   incentivize	   environmental	  
conservation.	  Most	  of	  the	  research	  in	  this	  area	  focuses	  on	  the	  monetary	  elements	  of	  these	  programs,	  
such	  as	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  incentive	  (Adams	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Engel	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Kosoy	  et	  al.,	  2007)	  or	  
the	   temporal	   structure	  of	   the	  contract	   (Clot	  et	  al,	  2014).	   So	   far,	   relatively	   little	  attention	  has	  been	  
paid	   to	   the	  words	   that	   are	   (or	   should	  be)	  used	   to	  describe	   such	  programs.	  We	   recognize	   that	   this	  
aspect	  of	  PES	  may	  seem	  trivial,	  prima	   facie,	   compared	   to	   the	   impact	  of	  more	   traditional	  economic	  
arguments.	  In	  light	  of	  our	  previous	  discussion,	  however,	  we	  believe	  that	  this	  factor	  deserves	  at	  least	  
some	  preliminary	  investigation.	  To	  assess	  the	  robustness	  of	  the	  properties	  associated	  with	  the	  words	  
payment	  and	  compensation,	  we	  added	  two	  categories1	   that	  distinguish	  two	  different	  origins	  of	   the	  
incentive	  (local	  organization	  vs.	   international	  organization),	  which	  produces	  the	  following	  2x2	  (‘two	  
by	  two’)	  between-­‐subject	  experimental	  design	  (Figure	  1).	  	  
Figure	  1	  -­‐	  2x2	  between	  subject	  experimental	  design	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Local	  organisation	   Treatment	  3	  (N=186)	   Treatment	  4	  (N=185)	  	  
The	   survey	   experiment	   consists	   of	   a	   text	   describing	   an	   environmental	   measure	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	  
market-­‐based	   instrument	   (PES).	   As	   presented	   in	   Figure	   1,	   we	   manipulate	   two	   aspects	   of	   this	  
measure.	  First,	   the	  monetary	   incentive	  received	  by	  the	  environmental	  service	  provider	  was	   labeled	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  Lepore	  and	  Brown	  (1997)	  for	  an	  in-­‐depth	  investigation	  of	  stereotype	  activation	  upon	  categorization.	  
	  	  
as	  either	  a	  ‘payment’	  or	  a	  ‘compensation’.	  Second,	  we	  manipulate	  the	  incentive	  source	  as	  originating	  
from	  either	  a	  local	  or	  an	  international	  organization.	  	  
Participants	  were	  then	  asked	  to	  rate	  their	  opinion	  of	  the	  project	  (in	  terms	  of	  expected	  impact)	  on	  a	  
scale	  from	  1	  (=	  very	  negative)	  to	  7	  (=	  very	  positive).	  We	  elicit	  socio-­‐economic	  information	  through	  a	  
survey	  administered	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment.	  Participants	  read	  the	  following	  text:	  
“Intensive	  agriculture	  has	  received	  growing	  attention	  in	  Madagascar.	  This	  type	  of	  agriculture	  leads	  to	  
impoverishment	   of	   soil	   quality	   and	   threatens	   the	   country's	   food	   security.	   An	   international/local	  
organization	  is	  committed	  to	  fight	  against	  this	  environmental	  and	  health	  threat.	  By	  encouraging	  the	  
use	  of	  agro-­‐ecological	  technology,	  this	  international/local	  organization	  wishes	  to	  promote	  the	  use	  of	  
alternative	   agriculture	   in	   order	   to	   reconcile	   the	   need	   for	   economic	   profitability	  with	   environmental	  
preservation.	  Agroecology	  aims	  at	  protecting	  soils	  by	  providing	  permanent	  vegetative	  cover.	   It	   thus	  
helps	   to	   restore	   the	   fertility	   of	   the	   land	   and	   increase	   its	   efficiency	   while	   simultaneously	   reducing	  
irrigation	  needs.	  The	  method	  supported	  by	   this	   international/local	  organization	   is	  considered	  to	  be	  
the	   most	   progressive.	   It	   involves	   no	   plowing	   or	   fertilizers,	   and	   helps	   to	   reduce	   carbon	   dioxide	  
emissions	  by	  fixing	  carbon	  in	  the	  soil.	  
On	   a	   scale	   from	   1	   to	   7,	   what	   do	   you	   think	   the	   overall	   impact	   of	   the	   project	   would	   be	   if	   the	  
international/local	  organization	  compensates/pays	  farmers	  practicing	  agroecology	  20,000Ar/ha?”	  	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
Very	  
negative	  







Positive	   Very	  positive	  
	  
 
The	   technical	   content	  of	   the	   text	   (the	  measures	   to	  be	  proposed,	   amount	  of	   the	   incentive	  offered,	  
etc.)	  were	  chosen	  using	  expert	  input	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  plausibility.	  The	  experiment	  
was	   conducted	   among	   746	   undergraduates	   (49.73%	   male)	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Antananarivo	  
(Madagascar)	  during	   the	   fall	  of	  2012.	  Our	  sample	   is	   comprised	  of	   students	   in	  agronomics	   (39.15%)	  
and	  economics.	  The	  majority	  of	  students	  are	  from	  Tananarive	  province	  (71.45%)	  and	  the	  average	  age	  
is	  21.76	  years.	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  any	  selection	  bias,	  students	  were	  not	  previously	  informed	  that	  they	  
would	  participate	   in	   a	   survey.	   Instead,	   they	  were	  already	  present	   at	   a	   scheduled	   course	  when	   the	  
survey	  was	  administered	  as	  a	  classroom	  activity	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  period.	  	  
	  	  
The	  characteristics	  of	  our	  sample	  are	  provided	   in	  Table	  1.	  The	  sample	  appears	   to	  be	  well	  balanced	  
across	   the	   four	   treatments,	   with	   no	   statistical	   differences	   between	   groups	   regarding	   gender,	   age,	  
resources,	  profile	  (agronomics	  vs.	  economics)	  or	  origin	  (Tananarive	  vs.	  Non	  Tananarive). 
Table	  1	  –	  Sample	  characteristics	  -­‐	  Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  H	  test	  of	  between-­‐group	  differences	  across	  
participants	  assigned	  to	  the	  four	  treatment	  groups.	  
	  	  (N=746)	   	  All	   (1)	  	  Treatment	  1	   (2)	  	  Treatment	  2	   (3)	  	  Treatment	  3	   (4)	  	  Treatment	  4	   	  H-­‐statistics	   	  P-­‐value	  
Socio-­demographic	  characteristics	  Gender	  ratio	  (%	  of	  male)	   49.73	   48.15	   51.63	   51.61	   47.57	   1.063	   0.7859	  
Age	   21.76	   21.74	   21.89	   21.64	   21.77	   1.756	   0.6246	  
Monthly	  resources	  (%)	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
<	  50	  000	  Ar/month	   47.76	   50	   46.20	   47.83	   46.96	   0.000	   1	  
>	  50	  000	  Ar/month;	  <	  100	  000	  Ar/month	   32.97	   30.85	   32.61	   33.70	   34.81	   0.000	   1	  >	  100	  000	  Ar/month	   19.27	   19.15	   21.20	   18.48	   18.23	   0.000	   1	  
Agronomic	  major	  (%)	   39.15	   37.63	   34.95	   38.38	   37.53	   0.799	   0.8498	  
Origin	  (%	  from	  Antananarivo)	   71.45	   70.90	   68.82	   77.42	   68.65	   0.503	   0.4781	  
 
Figure	  2	  illustrates	  our	  experimental	  results.	  The	  main	  outcome	  shows	  a	  significant	  difference	  in	  how	  
people	   expect	   the	   program	   to	   perform	   when	   its	   participants	   are	   described	   as	   being	   paid	   vs.	  
compensated.	  Specifically,	  treatments	  referring	  to	  ‘compensation’	  elicit	  to	  greater	  confidence	  ratings	  
than	   those	   referring	   to	   ‘payment’	   (t=2.4567,	   p=0.014).	   This	   effect	   is,	   furthermore,	   robust	   to	  
variations	  in	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  incentive:	  ‘compensation’	  generates	  greater	  optimism	  than	  ‘payment’,	  
at	  a	  1%	  significance	  level,	   in	  both	  scenarios	  (local	  vs.	   international	  organization).	  We	  also	  note	  that	  
people	  indicate	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  trust	  in	  international	  organizations	  than	  in	  local	  organizations	  (t=-­‐
2.3544,	  p=0.018).	  Taken	  together,	  these	  results	  suggest	  that	  the	  combination	  that	  leads	  to	  the	  most	  
favorable	  average	  rating	   is	  an	  international	  organization	  that	  compensates	  (treatment	  2),	  while	  the	  
	  	  
worst	   combination	   appears	   to	  be	   the	   local	   organization	   that	   pays	   (treatment	   3).	   The	  difference	   in	  
average	  rating	  between	  these	  two	  alternatives	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  1%	  level	  (p=0.000).	  
Figure	  2	  –	  Evaluation	  of	  the	  overall	  project	  impact	  by	  respondents	  across	  treatments	  
(On	  a	  Likert	  scale	  from	  1	  [Very	  negative]	  to	  7	  [Very	  positive])	  	  
	  	  	  
In	  addition,	  we	  find	  that	  economists	  exhibit	  greater	  optimism	  than	  agronomists	  (t=1.9647,	  p=0.049).	  
Interestingly,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  word	  ‘payment’	  seems	  to	  have	  a	  greater	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  ratings	  
made	  by	  students	  in	  economics	  vs.	  students	  in	  agronomics.	  Both	  categories	  of	  students	  seem	  to	  be	  
equally	  influenced	  by	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  incentives’	  origin	  (local	  vs.	  international	  institution).	  
We	  conclude	  this	  analysis	  by	  running	  an	  ordered	  probit	  regression	  with	  project’s	  anticipated	  impact	  
rating	   (1	   =	   very	   negative;	   7	   =	   very	   positive)	   as	   the	   ordinal	   dependent	   variable.	   We	   find	   that	   the	  
impact	   of	   wording	   (incentive	   label	   and	   incentive	   origin)	   on	   people’s	   perception	   of	   the	   proposed	  
project	   is	   significant	   in	   the	   case	   of	   market-­‐based	   instruments	   for	   conservation.	   The	   relationship	  
between	  how	  a	  project	  is	  rated	  and	  the	  words	  used	  to	  describe	  it	  is	  significant	  (model	  1)	  and	  remains	  
so	  after	  controlling	  for	  various	  demographic	  and	  financial	  variables	   (model	  2).	  We	  find	  no	  effect	  of	  
gender,	   age	  or	   local	  origin,	  but	   the	   regression	  does	   illustrate	  a	   significant	   relationship	  between	  an	  
individual’s	  profile	  and	  their	  expectation	  of	  the	  project’s	  impact.	  	  
	  	  
	  
Table	  2	  –	  Project’s	  Opinion	  –	  Ordered	  probit	  model	  
	  	   (1)	  	  Model	  1	   (2)	  	  Model	  2	  
Income	  origin	  (Local	  organisation=1)	   0.181**	  (2.33)	   0.196**(2.50)	  Income	  type	  (Compensation=1)	   -­‐0.190**	  (-­‐2.44)	   -­‐0.185**(-­‐2.36)	  Sexe	  	   	   -­‐0.00521(-­‐0.06)	  Age	   	   -­‐0.0417*(-­‐1.90)	  Ressources	   	   -­‐0.0380(-­‐0.74)	  Profile	  (Agrologist=1)	   	   0.121**(2.35)	  Origin	  (Antananarivo=1)	   	   -­‐0.0953(-­‐1.07)	  Observations	   728	   720	  BIC	   2258.0	   2256.8	  Chi2	   11.39	   21.40	  p	   0.00336	   0.00322	  
 
t statistics in parentheses 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
	  
This	   survey	   experiment	   suggests	   that	   the	  way	   in	  which	   environmental	   conservation	  measures	   are	  
worded	  can	  have	  significant	  impacts	  on	  how	  these	  programs	  are	  received.	  Specifically,	  individuals	  in	  
our	   sample	   appear	   to	   be	   much	   more	   likely	   to	   believe	   in	   the	   success	   of	   a	   PES	   project	   when	   the	  
financial	   incentive	   is	   labeled	  as	  a	   ‘compensation’	   rather	   than	  a	   ‘payment’.	   In	   the	   following	  section,	  
we	  conclude	  and	  develop	  several	  implications	  of	  these	  results.	  
	  
4.	  Discussion	  and	  conclusion	  
Some	  scholars,	  especially	  those	  operating	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  standard	  economic	  theory,	  have	  argued	  
that	  variations	  in	  wording	  should	  simply	  be	  considered	  cheap	  talk	  and	  as	  such,	  should	  not	  influence	  
behaviour,	   especially	   in	   the	   presence	   of	  more	   persuasive	  monetary	   considerations.	   The	   validity	   of	  
this	   view	   seems	   even	  more	   plausible	   in	   the	   context	   of	   sophisticated	   agents	   involved	   in	   repeated	  
decisions.	  In	  contrast	  to	  this	  view,	  we	  review	  several	  psychological	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  words	  
are	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  influence	  on	  perceptions	  and	  subsequent	  decisions.	  We	  conduct	  a	  pilot	  
study	  providing	  preliminary	  evidence	  that	  treatments	  that	  are	  equivalent	  in	  pecuniary	  outcomes	  but	  
differ	   only	   by	   the	   word	   used	   to	   describe	   these	   outcomes	   (i.e.,	   compensation	   versus	   payment)	  
engender	   significantly	   different	   perceptions.	   Specifically,	   a	   proposed	   PES	   program	   involving	  
	  	  
‘compensation’	  is	  received	  more	  favorably	  than	  a	  program	  involving	  ‘payment’.	  A	  clear	  limitation	  of	  
our	   quasi-­‐experimental	   survey	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   we	   study	   a	   non-­‐incentivized	   intervention	   and	   our	  
sample	   is	   comprised	   entirely	   of	   students	   rather	   than	   farmers	   or	   the	   public.	   A	   field-­‐incentive	  
compatible	  experiment	  involving	  actual	  potential	  providers	  of	  ecosystem	  services	  would	  be	  a	  natural	  
and	  promising	  extension	  to	  this	  work.	  Moreover,	   investigating	  the	   impact	  of	  additional	  alternatives	  
(e.g.,	   reward,	  remuneration,	  recompense)	  as	  potential	  descriptors	  can	  enrich	  an	  analysis	  of	  how	  to	  
best	   label	   the	   monetary	   incentives	   offered	   by	   PES	   schemes.	   Investigating	   whether	   the	   beneficial	  
impact	  of	   strategic	  word	  choice	  endures	  over	   time	  also	  constitutes	  a	  promising	  extension.	   In	  what	  
follows,	   we	   develop	   several	   practical	   suggestions.	   However,	   we	   caution	   the	   reader	   against	   over-­‐
interpretation	  given	  that	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  obtained	  in	  our	  pilot	  study	  is	  preliminary	  in	  nature	  
and	  does	  not	  explicitly	  address	  all	  of	  the	  dimensions	  raised	  below.	  
Interestingly	   the	   issue	   we	   examine	   does	   not	   deal	   with	   the	   design	   or	   implementation	   of	   the	   PES	  
instrument	   itself.	   Instead,	   we	   investigate	   the	   possibility	   that	   the	   framing	   of	   the	   instrument	   can	  
constitute	  an	  effective	  but	  underappreciated	  intervention,	  one	  that	  is	  all	  the	  more	  appealing	  in	  the	  
light	  of	  time	  and	  budget	  constraints.	  The	  psychological	  literature	  and	  our	  quasi-­‐experimental	  results	  
suggest	   that	  words	   are	   not,	   in	   fact,	   neutral	   features	   of	   policy	   instruments,	   as	   they	  may	   activate	   a	  
variety	   of	   construals	   and	   for	   this	   reason,	   can	   ultimately	   represent	   powerful	   tools	   of	   influence.	   In	  
particular,	  words	  can	  either	  reinforce	  or	  harm	  policy	  objectives	  (e.g.,	  maximizing	  enrollment	  in	  a	  PES	  
scheme).	  Despite	  the	  considerable	  strategic	  potential	  of	  word	  choice,	  many	  economists	  and	  policy-­‐
makers	   remain	   unaware	   of	   the	   impacts	   that	   can	   be	   associated	  with	   these	   choices.	  We	   now	   raise	  
several	  critical	  issues	  and	  offer	  some	  suggestions	  for	  policy	  makers.	  
To	  help	  policy	  makers	  to	  anticipate	  the	  real	  effects	  of	  words	  and	  to	  avoid	  unintended	  consequences,	  
we	  echo	  Farrow	  et	  al.	  (2016)	  in	  suggesting	  the	  usefulness	  of	  establishing	  an	  extensive	  list	  of	  potential	  
terms	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  label	  an	  environmental	  measure,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  variety	  
of	   factors	   that	   are	   not	   typically	   considered	   in	   policy	   design	   processes.	   An	   inventory	   of	   potential	  
descriptors	  could	  include,	  for	  example:	  
• All	  synonyms	  of	  candidate	  terms	  as	  well	  as	  closely	  related	  words	  and	  with	  their	  denotative	  
and	  connotative	  meanings,	  among	  the	  general	  public	  as	  well	  as	  among	  specific	  relevant	  sub-­‐
populations.	  
• How	  commonly	  the	  word	  is	  used	  in	  the	  given	  community	  and	  its	  easiness	  to	  pronounce,	  both	  
of	   which	   can	   affect	   processing	   fluency	   and	   conceptual	   associations	   (Song	   and	   Schwartz,	  
2009),	  	  
	  	  
• Any	  ‘historical’	  considerations	  associated	  with	  the	  word	  in	  the	  given	  community2,	  	  
• Other	  constraints	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  a	  specific	  term	  (e.g.	  regulatory	  constraints).	  	  
To	   the	  extent	   that	  additional	  communities	  are	   likely	   to	  be	  concerned	  by	  a	  particular	  project	   in	   the	  
future	  (e.g.	  through	  expansion),	  it	  also	  seems	  prudent	  to	  use	  the	  most	  versatile	  language	  possible	  in	  
the	  original	   implementation	  of	   the	  measure	   in	  order	   to	  maintain	  broad	  subsequent	  applicability.	   If	  
several	   languages	   are	   involved	   in	   a	   project’s	   implementation,	   as	   is	   the	   case	   with	   North-­‐South	  
instruments	   and	   those	   spanning	   several	   countries	   (e.g.	   Europe’s	   Common	   Agricultural	   Policy),	  
translation	   issues	  must	   also	   be	   carefully	   considered	   at	   an	   early	   stage.	  Moreover,	   even	   if	   potential	  
participants	   share	   the	   same	   language,	   it	   is	   also	  wise	   to	  maintain	   a	   cautious	   approach,	   as	   regional	  
linguistic	  differences	  could	  conceivably	  have	  significant	  implications	  on	  program-­‐related	  perceptions	  
and	   behaviours.	   The	   cultural	   framework	   in	  which	   a	   policy	   takes	   place	   is	   also	   of	   great	   importance,	  
especially	   considering	   that	   stereotype-­‐activating	   words	   might	   have	   greater	   impact	   among	   certain	  
subsets	  of	  a	  wider	  population.	  Indeed,	  in	  our	  survey,	  economists	  reacted	  more	  strongly	  to	  the	  word	  
‘payment’	  than	  did	  agronomists.	  	  
Expert	  opinions	  from	  linguists	  should	  also	  be	  solicited	  in	  order	  to	  help	  refine	  such	  a	  word	  database.	  
Based	   on	   this	   information,	  we	   encourage	   performing	   pilot	   (quasi)experimental	   studies	   in	   order	   to	  
identify	   the	   most	   beneficial	   words	   to	   use	   in	   policy	   descriptions,	   or	   at	   least	   those	   words	   that	  
policymakers	  would	  do	  well	  to	  avoid	  if	  they	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  lead	  to	  counterproductive	  effects.	  
Our	   results	   also	   stress	   the	   importance	   of	   taking	   into	   account	   how	   word	   choice	   can	   impact	   PES	  
performance	  in	  unexpected	  ways,	  even	  at	  very	  preliminary	  stages.	  First	   impression	  bias	  should	  also	  
be	  taken	  into	  consideration,	  as	  once	  a	  word	  has	  been	  used,	  it	  can	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  alter	  people’s	  
subsequent	   construals	   and	   associations.	   These	   results	   also	   call	   for	   caution	   when	   communicating	  
about	  policies.	  Prior	   research	  on	  people’s	  perceptions	  of	   specific	  program	  characteristics	  can	  be	  of	  
great	   value	   in	   improving	   the	   way	   in	   which	   projects	   are	   received,	   and	   improved	   perceptions	   can	  
potentially	   lead	   to	  higher	   enrollment.	  Given	   the	   severity	  of	   global	   ecological	   issues,	  we	  encourage	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Experimental	  evidence	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  level	  of	  cooperation	  can	  greatly	  differ	  according	  to	  the	  
name	   of	   the	   game	   (e.g.,	   Kay	   and	   Ross,	   2003;	   Liberman	   et	   al.,	   2004;	   Dufwenberg	   et	   al.,	   2011).	  
Dufwenberg	   et	   al.,	   2011	   find	   that	   playing	   the	   same	   game	   (with	   an	   identical	   payoff	   structure	   and	  
instructions)	   under	   the	   labels	   "the	  Community	   game"	  or	   "the	  Wall	   Street	   game"	  affected	  peoples’	  
willingness	  to	  cooperate	  dramatically.	  People	  who	  were	  told	  they	  were	  playing	  the	  Community	  game	  
cooperated	   about	   70	   percent	   of	   the	   time,	  while	   those	  who	  were	   told	   they	  were	   playing	   the	  Wall	  
Street	  Game	  cooperated	  only	  about	  33	  percent	  of	  the	  time.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  influence	  appeared	  to	  
be	  country	  dependent.	  The	  magnitude	  of	  the	  impacts	  associated	  with	  these	  labels	  were	  opposite	  in	  
Switzerland	   and	   Germany.	   The	   authors	   hypothesized	   that	   the	   German	   word	   for	   community	   has	  
different	  connotations	  as	  a	  result	  of	  country-­‐specific	  historical	  events.	   ‘Community’	  was	  thought	  to	  
have	  a	  negative	  connotation	  in	  Germany	  and	  a	  positive	  connotation	  in	  Switzerland.	  
	  	  
policy-­‐makers	   not	   to	   under-­‐estimate	   these	   considerations	   and	   to	   devote	   significant	   resources	   to	  
exploring	  them.	  A	  natural	  extension	  to	  this	  experiment	  would	  be	  to	  replicate	  it	  among	  farmers	  and	  
other	  providers	  of	  ecosystem	  services	  in	  real-­‐world	  settings	  in	  which	  these	  subtle	  manipulations	  have	  
the	   potential	   to	   impact	   behavioural	   intentions,	   enrollment	   in,	   and	   overall	   performance	   of,	   PES	  
instruments.	  
In	  conclusion,	   if	  further	  support	   is	  found	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  public	  policies	  are	  
framed,	   we	   suggest	   avoiding	   a	   ‘one-­‐word-­‐fits-­‐all’	   approach	   and	   encourage	   greater	   deliberation	  
surrounding	   the	  words	   used	   in	   public	   policies.	  We	   also	   recommend	   that	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   analyses	   be	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